565 ranks of the State's bureaucratic machinery, while the majority are
661 now under strict police surveillance.

565 With respect to national consciousness, trustworthiness and
668 unshaken opposition to the hated regime which dispossessed them, these people can be counted on. Individually they are well educated; many of them speak several languages and have a broad knowledge of local, national, and international problems. Many of them have relatives and friends abroad. Although they could probably perform liaison activities well, any attempt to give them prominence in a subversive organization would be a mistake because, as a rule, they are regarded as pillars of social reaction and few of the peasants or laboring groups would particularly care for such leaders, fearing their deep-rooted conservatism and autocratic tendencies. Furthermore, Communist propaganda [208] repeats ceaselessly that the only aim of the United States and other democratic governments is to re-establish the old autocratic or oligarchic system in Hungary and elsewhere.

Before the Communists seized power, the intelligentsia or the middle class provided Hungary with many outstanding personalities in different fields, especially education, science, art, business, and even politics. Under the Communists, the middle class underwent a basic

change. Those who had been closely connected with the pre-Communist regimes were purged, while the rest have recently rejoined the ranks of the State bureaucracy as elder but silenced members. Besides these, recent years have produced a new group of State administrators who hate the other group, yet who still try to imitate their manners. This top group as a whole, the non-peasant and non-industrial-worker group, being so strangely heterogeneous and antagonistic one to another, their subversive potentiality as a unit is negligible. Individually, the older generation of intellectuals are more reliable, although they are a little class-conscious, submissive and opportunistic to some extent. They resent the social set-back which lowered them from their pre-war influential positions to the ranks of the "white-collar proletariat."

The industrial workers, the most rapidly growing class in Hungary, are more homogeneous and united than the middle class. Except for the recent recruits in the factories, who constitute a rather strong minority, the majority of the industrial workers belonged to or sympathized with the pre-Communist free trade union organizations, and they are keenly class conscious and highly realistic as far as wages and living conditions versus the idealistic goals expounded by Communist

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propaganda are concerned. They do not fail to notice, either, that the primary cause of their exploitation is the economic subjugation of Hungary to Soviet Russia. The present government, although tending to favor them above any other social class, cannot assure them a decent living standard, and as long as this continues the work slow-downs, the sporadic work stoppages, and sabotage will not disappear. The subversive potentialities of the industrial workers are handicapped by the fact that among them, although in a minority, there are well-trained Communist agitators and hosts of informers whose work is facilitated by the concentration of industry in Hungary. By the same token, however, the workers are better organized and a revolutionary impetus perhaps could create among them an almost instantaneous response.

The peasants are the largest social group in Hungary, their culture is the most unique, and they are the most anti-Communist of any of the Hungarians. Even those peasants who have not suffered a direct financial loss from the Communist regime (landless agricultural workers, small peasants) are poles apart from the Communists by virtue of their individualistic tendencies and their religiousness. The settlement pattern of the peasants being very varied--from the lonely tanya to the "giant village"--they can be fitted easily into

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many kinds of subversive activity from mass uprisings to guerrilla warfare. The most reliable among them are the richer peasants, if for no other reason than the discrimination which the present government uses against them.

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The Christian churches by their very nature are opposed to the political practice of Bolshevism and are thus potentially subversive. From the purely ideological point of view, the Catholic Church is the most effectively anti-Communist by virtue of its own monolithic internal organization which virtually excludes any other spiritual allegiance than to the Church itself. Moreover, the Catholic Church is the only really nationwide organization in Hungary which can hardly be penetrated by Communist informers and agents because there is no elective principle among the clergy. The organization of the Church overflows the boundaries of social strata and could be powerful in coordinating subversive activities among groups otherwise socially isolated. Any serious attempt to overthrow the present government cannot dispense with Church backing.

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Allowing such subversive potentiality to the churches does not necessarily mean, however, that all the members of the clergy can be counted upon. Especially the more liberal Protestants have displayed

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a surprising willingness to compromise with the Communist regime. The politically neutral or pro-Communist segment of the Protestant clergy is a minority and the Protestants of Hungary have had their recent martyrs just like the Catholics. Nevertheless, this minority seems to be relatively larger than the number of Catholic priests collaborating with the Communists.

[208] : Catholic priests join the Communist political propaganda only sporadically. Those who are willing to lend their signatures to "peace campaigns" and other propaganda are on the verge of excommunication--several of them have already suffered this penalty--and their flock is aware of these leanings and does not trust them like the "regulars."

The importance of the Church opposition to the State is most significant in the villages where the population is most devout and the priests have great prestige among their parishioners. Social activities, the few which are legally permitted, give the parish priest an opportunity to keep in close contact with the members of the community.

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From the geographical point of view, Hungary, the flattest among the so-called satellite countries, lends itself with difficulty

133 668 to guerrilla and other clandestine activities. On the Great Plains, even the larger agricultural cities have a stable population, and strangers can be spotted easily among the local farmers whose activities are carefully watched over by the Communist police. The hill country of northern Hungary and Transdanubia, with its industrial cities and relatively dense forests, would provide readier shelters for those who might try to go unsuspected or unnoticed. Border zones, especially those bordering neighboring non-Soviet states--are thoroughly combed by reliable Communist patrols and are the least accessible.

668 There is no information readily available concerning possible subversive cells in action in Hungary or names of possible subversive leaders. How much mass appeal and actual influence the émigré Hungarian statesmen may still have upon their fellow countrymen is a problem too controversial and unsolvable to be discussed here. Certainly the names of many of these former leaders evoke cherished memories among certain older people in Hungary, but their actual power of inciting to action is highly debatable.

000 It must be reiterated here that Hungarian society is in the midst of a turmoil it has never before experienced in the modern era. The preceding brief and sometimes subjective statements may or may not be

728 But "those poor chaps" were sent and promptly got killed, like so many million other poor chaps, because these foolish gentlemen still refused to learn how to think.

728 On October 8th the Social Democratic Party demanded in a 443 declaration the immediate formation of a democratic government. This government, they said, must conclude a separate peace at once on the basis of Wilson's Points.

The declaration drew a true picture of Hungary's situation. For four years the people had fought for German Imperialism. The war would soon be lost. As yet there were no foreign troops on Hungarian territory. But there would be. The Hungarian people, who had been forced into this war against their will, would certainly be punished for the sins of their rulers. "The representatives of the feudal classes are still clinging to their power. We point to the hundreds of internal and external wounds of the country and tell you: This is what you have done. This is your work; yours is the responsibility."

Our lords still did not believe that the end had come. They told each other in their aristocratic clubs that the British would never let the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy collapse, just as in 1942 they told each other that the British would never permit the Russians to bomb Budapest. They thought they knew the British. After all, they had hunted with the British.

On October 17th 1918, Charles IV asked his good Austrian subjects "to form national councils for the creation of a federated State. Each nationality can form its own State autonomy."

What did the Hungarian lords do? Were they glad that independence was here at last? Oh no. *They forced the Emperor to exempt Hungary from this.* The Hungarian Premier threatened the Emperor that he would not send food to Austria if the Emperor did not add a point to this declaration stating that the integral nature of Hungary must be preserved. This is to say that the people living under the Austrian lords were given the chance to be free, but the people living under Hungarian lords were not.

Even so, the good lords were terribly worried. Their whole world collapsed when they saw that the Habsburg Kaiser was for Hungarian independence and against them. How could they call all the politicians who wanted independence traitors if even the Emperor proclaimed that Hungary might be separated from Austria?

Next day in the Hungarian Parliament the Opposition declared itself in favour of an independent Hungarian Government, a separate Hungarian Foreign Office, and peace. The big leaders of the "countocracy"—Tisza, Andrássy and the rest—protested against

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this. Prince Windischgraetz screamed at them: "You traitors! We will be loyal to our German Allies to the grave." (Meaning, of course, that *we*, the people, should die for the Germans.) The counts applauded. A few weeks later the very same counts who had said that being pro-Ally was treason all criticised *our* leaders for not being pro-Entente enough, and when the Allied missions arrived in Budapest it turned out that they had always hated the Germans and loved the British and the French.

Yes, they were the last to see what was coming, but when it came they had no scruples about going over from friend to foe. Count Andrássy, the famous "black Count", who was hated by the people and was leader of the reactionary aristocracy (just as Count Stephen Bethlen is leader of the countocracy today)—this "black Count Andrássy" was still a staunch supporter of the German cause on October 14th 1918.

Although the Kaiser gave Hungary independence, he insisted that she should have no separate Foreign Secretary. He won his case, and Andrássy became Foreign Secretary for both Austria and Hungary. In this capacity he promised full support to the Germans. Eleven days later he offered a separate peace. But those eleven days cost Hungary a lot.

On October 25th we elected a democratic National Council, headed by Michael Károlyi, to democratise Hungary and conclude peace. The lords still played their game of politics. A new reactionary count became premier.

On October 29th a great multitude of us wanted to go to the Royal Palace and demand that the king's deputy, Archduke Joseph, should make Károlyi premier. One of our leaders telephoned to the Archduke informing him of our intention and promising that we would "behave". The Archduke had a conference with his counts. When we arrived at the Danube bridge —a peaceful crowd, completely unarmed—three infantry companies blocked the way. We called to them to join our side, that we meant no harm. They promptly joined us, though the officers wanted them to shoot at us.

Then we tried to go on. But behind the military stood the police. They—without warning—immediately fired at us and then charged us with drawn swords. Many of us were killed, more than a hundred wounded. *We did not kill anybody.*

Then we grew angry. Together—soldiers and workers—we occupied the important public buildings. There was no resistance. The representatives of the police came to our National Council, begging our pardon, protesting that orders were orders and offering to join our council.

668 THIS WAS OUR REVOLUTION.

728 WE WERE FIRED AT. WE DID NOT HAVE TO USE ARMS.

Our revolution succeeded without bloodshed, just as in 1848. And, just as in 1848, so also in 1918 our cynical and clever lords managed to defeat our revolution, putting the chains of slavery on us again. In November 1919 the same old gang of counts and county gentlemen ground us into the earth, and they are doing so up to this very day.

At that time we did not know this. We only knew that the hated Habsburg Empire had at last collapsed. After four hundred years of Habsburg oppression we were—so we thought—finally free.

000 Naturally we did not behave like little lambs. We were drunk with happiness because peace had come. We were drunk with hatred of our officers. We wanted to have our revenge on those leaders who had forced us into the four years' slaughter, we wanted to pay back some of the cruel officers who had treated us like beasts. We wanted land and work. We wanted to get even with the profiteers who had palmed off on us paper-soled boots for us to freeze in. And above all we wanted to get home as quickly as possible. Nobody could hold us back. From every direction we streamed into Budapest and the other cities—from the Italian front, from the Eastern front, from everywhere. We crowded the trains; we crowded the roofs of the carriages. Hundreds of us were killed as the bridges knocked us off the tops of the trains. Our mood was dangerous. We tore off the insignia from the collars of our officers. We got used to killing. We had had four years' schooling in it. But we committed only one murder.

We murdered Count Stephen Tisza, the great reactionary lord whom we held responsible for the war. Later on our lords accused some politicians and journalists of the murder of Count Tisza. Their innocence was established. No, we, the "unknown soldiers", killed Tisza. *We* are prepared to take full responsibility for this murder. Is it only our lords who have the right to send us to be slaughtered by the hundred thousand in their interests, while we have no right to revenge? No, sir.

We were in a bad mood. Four years of hell did not make angels out of us. The streets of Budapest were full of us, ragged soldiers, poor comrades twitching with shell-shock, soldiers, soldiers who were lean and fierce, like wolves.

668 There was a tremendous muddle in Budapest and the country. In Budapest alone more than three hundred thousand of us were waiting to be demobilised, to be sent home. We got roaring drunk if we had the chance. We attacked officers and gentlemen.

Our lords grew frightened. After the front had collapsed, after we had streamed back from the front in our vicious mood, after the victorious armies had begun to approach from every direction—that is, too late—they let the power fall from their hands. They were glad to give the power to the National Council, headed by the same Count Michael Károlyi who during the war had always opposed it, who had always said that the two Kaisers were the natural enemies of the Hungarian people, who was in touch with the Allies. 668

Count Michael Károlyi was tremendously popular with us. We remembered that the jingoist press had always accused him of treason for wanting to make peace. We remembered that during 1916 and 1917 he had even made public speeches in favour of peace. We remembered that the military court of Count Tisza had accused him of treason. A thousand years of experience has taught us that anybody whom our lords accuse of treason is on our side. We were not mistaken.

Count Károlyi became President of the Hungarian Republic. Hungary—we must mention this—seceded from Austria on October 16th 1918, before the Austro-Hungarian collapse. Károlyi came to power on November 2nd.

Our revolutionary government, composed of liberals and socialists, had to face the situation created by the sudden and complete collapse of the Habsburg Empire. Two million soldiers were streaming back from the fronts. Refugees were coming from the neighbouring countries in tens of thousands. The railway system collapsed. The whole organisation of the country collapsed. The French general in Serbia blockaded Hungary. The food situation was appalling.

Károlyi and his people had a gigantic task. To bring the chaotic and dismembered country into a state of order, to negotiate with the Allies, to prepare the way for a democratic Hungary.

The Károlyi Government's first thought was to solve the land situation. They drew up a land reform programme which aimed at distributing among us, the land-workers, all estates exceeding five hundred acres, for which the State would recompense the owners. They planned co-operatives and agricultural boards. And they were not just talking. 668 423

Károlyi started his land reform on his own land at the beginning of 1919. He had huge estates. He gave them all to us. We must confess that many of us thought that even Károlyi was too mild with the land-owning class. But our lords considered this land reform a terrible outrage and did everything to prevent it. They successfully

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668 denounced the Karolyi Government to the foreign Allied missions
423 in Budapest as Bolshevik. In this way they achieved two results. Result number one was that the Allied missions turned against the man who was loyal to the idea of peace all through the war, who was against Germany all through the war. The Allied missions and Governments allowed the Rumanian, Czech and Serb forces —even after the armistice was signed—considerably to extend their occupation of purely Hungarian territories. Result number two was that in default of Allied aid the Károlyi Government was defeated by the Communists. The great lords, all the aristocrats, were very happy the day Communism was proclaimed in Hungary. They feared that the Allies might discover that Károlyi's Government was democratic, that they would help Károlyi, and that democracy would then be established in Hungary. If there were real, out-and-out Communists ruling Hungary—so the lords hoped—it would be easier to get help from the Allies against the Communists, who would be beaten. Then they could return and get back their land. The calculations of these lords, led by Count Stephen Bethlen, were right.

CHAPTER X

728 In 1919 the Károlyi Government went to pieces because of
648 the blind stubbornness of the French commander at Belgrade,
669 Franchet D'Esperay, who snubbed and humiliated the Hungarian Government—which had, after all, overthrown the war-time administration and was democratic and anti-German. At last the Károlyi Government's position became impossible. Some of the great lords, who had influence over Franchet D'Esperay, saw with pleasure that the people's Hungary—the Hungary of Károlyi and of the Communists—was left by this extreme reactionary French general to the mercies of her neighbours. They knew that the people's Hungary would in this way be defeated. The "Red" scare of the Allies was exploited by all our enemies.

On March 20th 1919, a French lieut.-colonel, a certain Vyx, handed the Károlyi Government a new order of the Allies demanding that Hungary should accept a fresh line of demarcation. Some month previously Hungary had already signed an armistice with the Allies in Belgrade. This was severe enough, cutting deeply into territories inhabited by Hungarians. Now the Allies—determined to make "Red" Hungary as small as possible—presented a new demand in the form of a fresh line of demarcation

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years, St. Stephen's Hungary, which is one of the oldest states in the world that has existed in unbroken succession. You see, *their* Hungary is an aristocrat among the countries. They despise such newly-created countries as Rumania or Yugoslavia, always forgetting that every person and every people have just as long an ancestry as any other person or people.

Our lords talk about Hungary's cultural superiority. Well, we are not elegant lords, but we do not consider bragging and self-praise good manners. It may or may not be true that there is more "culture" in Hungary than in Rumania, but if this is so it is certainly not the fault of the Rumanian people. And it would not be a reason why our lords should rule them.

But if our lords could put St. Stephen's crown on the head of any king, it would mean that equality of peoples was not accepted in the Danube basin, that people would be taught to hate and despise each other instead of living together in peace. Those nice American business men or British lords who would like to give us a king ought to know that by creating a kingdom for us they would hurt not only us but their own interests too, because after all they cannot profit from wars, revolutions and disorder. Or can they?

We have said that Count Bethlen and his friends set to work to wreck our future. They firmly took over public education, the press and the radio. They poisoned, or tried to poison, our minds against all our neighbours; they taught false history to our children. They trained the children as you train dogs to hate and despise without thinking.

They wrecked our future pretty thoroughly. While they did everything to cloud and poison the minds of the young, they directed Hungarian policy towards the present catastrophe. On two occasions—in 1921 and 1926—President Masaryk of Czechoslovakia offered Count Bethlen a revision of the Czech–Hungarian frontier, offering to return certain territories.

Bethlen and Horthy did not accept this because they—the rulers of the thousand-year-old Hungary—did not want to become members of the newly-created Little Entente of the Succession States. They wanted to have unsatisfied national claims with which to work on us. And mainly they wanted back the St. Stephen frontiers with all their foreign populations. You see, the "white count's burden" again.

At this time our lords were still anti-German because there was a democratic régime in Germany. They turned pro-German in 1933, when Hitler made Germany safe for the Junkers, and pro-Austrian in 1934, when the Catholic-Fascists destroyed Austrian democracy.

642 the government and their police. Everything needed government permission. You could not make a speech, start a newspaper or even write an article without government approval. Newspapers and books were banned and confiscated. People were interned. Our leaders were shadowed and imprisoned on the least little suspicion.

The real opposition to Count Bethlen succeeded once or twice in putting in *their* new word—"counter-selection". By this they meant that Bethlen and his set selected "safe" persons for parliament, the press, the opposition, professions, universities . . . they made quite sure of not letting anybody into any key position who might be dangerous to their feudal rule or might give away the show of camouflaged dictatorship.

Well, this was what we meant when we said that the Horthy–Bethlen rule wrecked our future (and thereby incidentally helped to wreck Europe's future).

668 One of our leaders, Imre Kovács, wrote that our lords wanted to keep Hungary as a sort of National Park of Feudalism in the middle of Europe, very much like the American National Parks, which preserve conditions as they were long ago.

This National Park of Feudalism was the aim of our lords between the two wars. Of course, they talked a lot about having been defeated in 1918, but they went on managing their huge estates, driving about in their expensive cars, having a good time with their beautiful mistresses, while we had even less to eat and even more to oppress us than before. It was the same in Germany. The "Nazis" of 1914–18—that is, the Junker landlords, factory owners and generals—soon asserted *their* victory, though the German people were beaten. The lost war of their lords gave the very same lords a good excuse to defeat them.

In Hungary the victory of the lords became apparent earlier. Very soon after the revolution had been defeated Bethlen and Horthy completed the National Park of Feudalism with its lovely democratic camouflage. But within the National Park *we* did not stay unchanged. *Our lot grew worse, our understanding clearer.*

We learnt a great deal during the war and revolutions. We thought a great deal about our defeats. We began to discover that understanding the world was not a privilege of our lords, and that if we thought industriously, courageously and determinedly we might perhaps understand the world better than they did.

Land-workers started to organise. It was illegal to do so. We organised. People sent us books and helped to educate us clandestinely. This was illegal, too. The Socialists and industrial workers were forbidden to establish contact with us. Some did. Our land-

668 worker movement—deep under the ground of the feudal National Park—got a real start. We knew then, and we know still, that our war against the lords will be a long war with huge losses. But we started to prepare. Of course you do not expect us to mention names and facts about our movement. Armies at war do not give away their secrets.

But we started to organise on a grand scale. Thanks to the cold dictatorship and counter-selection of our lords, many persons from above joined us. We had our fifth column everywhere, from the aristocratic clubs and ministries down to the pubs where the village gentry met. So the Horthy–Bethlen Gestapo was not very effective against us.

When Count Bethlen resigned in 1931, because he could get no more foreign loans and because he had led the country into bankruptcy, we were hopeful. An insignificant old aristocrat was chosen as his successor in the aristocratic clubs where our premiers are made. We thought that our life would be easier, that our organisation would meet with fewer obstacles.

We were sadly mistaken. With Bethlen out of the way the petty accomplices of the White Terrorist lords soon came to power. The Horthy–Bethlen "counter-selection" worked well as far as the safety of feudalism was concerned. But the small gentry, and those lower middle class men who pretended to be gentry, wanted a larger share of the profit. Our counts are a pretty cynical lot, but at least they have some sense of humour and some taste. And anyhow they had quite as much wealth as they wanted. After the eleven years of cynically cold and well-camouflaged terror of the "black Count", their hungry henchmen, who had no taste and less humour, seized the direct power. Bethlen and his friends had to be satisfied with exercising ultimate control from behind the scenes, through Horthy. Of course they did not lift a finger to save us—the people—or their beloved "culture" from the brutally stupid "Gömbösists".

642 661 The outside world learnt in 1932 that a strong man had taken over rule in Hungary. He was General Gömbös, a Hungarian nobleman. Well, this Gömbös was not strong but mean and hysterical like his great master, Hitler. He was not Hungarian but German, his real name being Graner. His mother could not speak a word of Hungarian. He was not a nobleman, but only pretended to be one. He was not a general, but only a Captain of the Reserve who forced Horthy to promote him to the rank of general from that of captain.

Gömbös' rule was as full of obnoxious lies as his person. He was one of the fiercest White Terrorists at the beginning of the

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Before the war, the Italian people lived for more than ten years, and the German people for seven years, under such a tyranny, and got no help from outside. They asked for help. People escaped and cried aloud to the world about the horrors inside Germany and about the future, when Hitler would let those horrors loose on the world. A huge library could be filled with articles, speeches and books uttering such warnings. *And nothing happened.*

We watched all this and got more worried every day. Hitler and Mussolini received financial help from the Western Democracies. Our Nazis grew more and more triumphant and optimistic. The Hoare–Laval pact, or the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, was *their* victory.

The White Terrorists appeared again. Their actions showed us clearly when the people's cause suffered a defeat anywhere. Was Mussolini permitted to massacre the Abyssinians? Next day Jewish students were beaten up in Budapest University. Did Hitler march into the Rhineland or Austria? Next day the village White Terrorists tortured the leaders of the land-workers.

Each victory of the Nazi–Fascist militarists in Spain, in Munich, in Prague, made the White Terrorists bolder. They now adopted the catchword "Arrow Cross"—*i.e.*, they became Hungarian Nazis. They boasted that the rich Jewish financiers had been frightened into financing them, and that the Fascists in Spain, Germany and Italy received loans from France, England and America.

We watched with cold fear in our hearts. Would the people of France, Britain and America let their lords and banks and appeasers permit the Nazi-Fascists to be helped to complete victory?

Our leaders, our advisers, the young writers who travelled abroad, said "No". They said that it would take a long time before the voice of the simple people abroad was heard. At present they "minded their own business". At present they believed their governments when they were told that the way to fight gangsters was to let them go on robbing and murdering. But soon it would be demonstrated to them that the appeasers were wrong, and then the great Western World would become our Allies in fighting all the Nazi-Fascists, from Hitler and Mussolini to Franco, Horthy, Mannerheim and the rest. They—our leaders and advisers—urged us to organise, to learn and to prepare. Our day would come.

But meanwhile every day our enemies inside the country grew not only bolder but stronger too. And the outside world looked

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right or wrong, the people were both anti-Nazi and anti-German, which you can understand after reading our history.

"The people" is a rather ambiguous term in any language. First we must state what we do *not* mean by "the people". The number of lower-class State employees, railway workers, municipal servants, post and telegraph workers, office servants in ministries, public offices, banks, etc., is about one million (including their families). They are not "the people". They get a small fixed salary and they look forward to their State pensions. They are staunch supporters of the régime. They belong to the State in just the same way as the regular N.C.O.s, police and gendarmerie, professional army officers and middle-class Civil Servants. This second group, with their families and dependants, represent nearly another million. Well, these two million are not "the people"; they are blindly loyal to the régime, they read the government press and support the government. Of the six hundred thousand Germans living in Hungary in 1938, more than a third are included in this group. Most of the other four hundred thousand Germans are natural allies of this mass of two million reactionary, right-wing, anti-Semitic and pension-loving group. The Hungarian Nazis recruited their followers from this group.

When we speak of "the people", we mean the industrial and land-workers, the estate servants, the dwarf-holders who must hire themselves out, the small and independent artisans, the white-collar workers of finance, industry and commerce, and the professional classes. This group represents three-quarters of the Hungarian population. Naturally you find some pro-Nazis in this group, just as you find even Communists in the "reactionary group".

The power belonged in 1938, as it belongs now, to the "régime". As post-1920 Hungary is certainly not a parliamentary democracy, as there has never been a chance, and is even less now, to turn out a government by parliamentary vote, ultimate power seems to be in the hands of Horthy. But this is not quite true. Ultimate power rests with the "régime"—that is, with the not quite harmonious combine or alliance of the following groups: the great landowners and aristocrats led by Count Bethlen, the former White Terrorist officers, the General Staff, the government party, and lastly the great industrialists led by the Jewish Chorin and Kornfeld. Most of the leading members of the General Staff are the sons or grandsons of the Austro-Habsburg civil and military service men who ruled Hungary after 1849. These General Staff officers of German origin became more Nazi than the Germans.

Even in 1932 Gömbös-Gömbölini started to ape Hitler and

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668 Mussolini. Since that time we have heard every month about a new would-be leader of the Hungarian Nazi-Fascist "masses". As the government press informed the two million people in the pay of the government that Horthy and Bethlen were really the first Fascists in Europe, as most of the government party deputies seemed to be pro-Nazi, as the professional army seemed to belong to the Extreme Right, these masses started to join the various Hungarian Nazi movements, in order not to be too late in climbing on the band-wagon. The early self-styled Nazi leaders were the Habsburg Archduke Albrecht, various members of the Festetich, Széchenyi and Pálffy families, the half-Armenian General Staff Major Szálasi, three generals and various members of the Szeged White Terrorists. All these would-be leaders were ambitious, and every military and political event of the period made them bolder.

Then the Horthy–Bethlen set grew afraid that these extremists might take the power away from them, and promptly adopted *their political line*. At that time their internal slogan was "We must take the wind out of their sails". So when the Extreme Right groups and the various Arrow Cross and Nazi parties demanded anti-Jewish legislation, closer collaboration with the Axis and more determined anti-democratic policy, the Horthy–Bethlen set passed anti-Jewish laws, started closer collaboration with Hitler and grew increasingly Fascist. In Hungary the Arrow Cross groups represented the Nazis, and the Horthy set the Papen–Hindenburg–Huggenberg group, but the Hungarian Nazis had no chance of starting their "revolution", for the Hungarian Papen (Bethlen) and the Hungarian Hindenburg (Horthy) swiftly and effectively out-Nazied the Nazis.

Now watch closely the next trick of our lords. They had to defend themselves against their Extreme Right opposition—that is, against the dissatisfied members of their own régime. At the same time they did not want to give all the power to Hitler. As the General Staff was flirting with the Extreme Right and there was a danger that they might stage a *coup d'état*, the Horthy–Bethlen set suddenly gave more freedom to the legally democratic opposition, and paid lip-service to parliamentarianism, constitutionalism, historic traditions and national independence. The Extreme Right attacked all these ideas, and the "leftish" opposition defended them. So the "leftish" opposition kept the balance for the Horthy–Bethlen set.

At the same time our lords said to the Germans: "You want food, industrial products, communications and soldiers from Hungary. Very well, you can have them *if there is law and order*

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668 *in the country*. We can maintain order and give you everything you want if you allow us to keep up the pretence of parliamentarianism, a semi-free press, a little democratic propaganda and the existence of the 'leftish' opposition."

The Germans agreed. The Horthy–Bethlen set used its power to weaken the Extreme Right groups, which were constantly attacked by the democratic opposition. But this trick, and these tactics, helped the "left" to organise.

The liberal, democratic and social democratic left were conscious of their past mistakes. They had on their side a lot of intrigues, suicides, compromises, jealousies and muddles. During 1938 they thought that all was lost and the left would be wiped out. Then came the trick of the Horthy–Bethlen set. The left at first cautiously, later with determination, used the chance. Groups were organised to prepare for coalition. Various leftish centres of resistance were created under the camouflage of regional literary societies and cultural clubs. The writers became very active. In Hungarian politics the important things have been done chiefly by writers. The 1848 revolution was created, organised and led by the young and ardent poet Petőfi. When the great lords and their politicians betrayed the country by collaborating with the Habsburgs, the Turks, Metternich or Hitler, the writers became the politicians of Hungary. Now the various groups of writers and journalists representing the factory workers, land-workers, the people of Transylvania and the professional classes started to negotiate with each other to clear up differences and to present a common front to the outside world. Party politicians saw their chance, and climbed on the bandwagon of this new movement, which was sometimes called a democratic coalition, and sometimes the People's Front. University professors, newspaper owners and progressive counts joined in. This work was started in 1938. It took several years for the Horthy–Bethlen set to find out that they committed a mistake when they made these activities physically possible.

Let us recapitulate the situation in Hungary during the two years before the war. The régime has all the power, but some members and most of the masses of the régime are a bit more pro-Nazi than the government. So the government becomes outwardly more pro-Nazi, but permits the democratic opposition a little bit of freedom to keep the balance. But the pro-Nazi Extreme Right and the Arrow Cross can act and organise, while the democratic opposition can only vegetate. The leaders of the opposition are necessarily men of compromise, or *at least they have to pay lip-service to compromise*. In order to smuggle one single

668 642 democratic sentence into a speech or article, they must repeat a lot of Bethlenist and Horthyist phrases about Hungarian superiority over our neighbours, about thousand-year-old frontiers, about the horridness of internationalism. We do not accuse this or that democratic or Trade Union leader of bad faith. We simply say that, in the huge Potemkin village of camouflaged Fascism which was Hungary between the two wars, even the opposition was something of a Potemkin-village opposition: it unfortunately created the impression that it was a part of the show produced by our clever Count Bethlen.

So while the Extreme Right and the Arrow Cross could count on fanatical Jew-haters, office-seekers and ambitious would-be S.A. and S.S. leaders, while the government could rely upon safe Civil Servants, and while Hitler knew that our General Staff would be loyal to him whatever happened, we, the people, representing 75% of the population, were not fanatical followers of our so-called parliamentary representatives and leaders of the opposition. They smelt to us too much of the government, they had in their record too many tactical steps for the sake of compromise, to inspire fanaticism in us.

000 History frequently produces unjust situations. Many of these opposition politicians—we are quite sure—would have preferred to fight openly. But in the country of our lords this was impossible. So they thought that if they could not have a pure banner, at least they ought to have *some* banner. The chief thing was to have some sort of banner of progressive thought, liberalism or social democracy flying. *But tiny and somewhat soiled banners do not inspire men to great deeds.*

It is probably true that it was infinitely better to have some Trade Unions than no Trade Unions at all. It was better that some liberal ideas should be voiced. It is also probably true that the existence of these parties and movements educated a lot of people and a lot of us. But it is equally true that banners should be clean, that we trusted those young men who went to prison for their books, speeches and articles, who were tortured because of their secret organisations, whose periodicals were banned, who chose prison or exile instead of compromise.

Our real leaders, our friends and advisers, had a hard time getting in touch with us and organising us. Our organisations in 1939 were tiny compared to the huge police state of our lords, which had the backing of Hitler's Germany in case we revolted.

We talked of revolt a lot. Please imagine the small flat of one of "our writers". There are a number of us, young land-

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CHAPTER II

THE ANTECEDENTS OF PLANNING

THE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK

668 THE shaping of the post-war policies of Hungary goes back to the time of German occupation. It was in the underground Resistance movement, where three parties co-operated, that the first outlines of a programme were drawn up. The co-operating parties were the Smallholders, the Social-Democrats, and the Communists. By the end of 1944, when the Germans had been expelled from the Eastern half of the country, the National Independence Front was set up, consisting of the three parties in the Resistance movement, the newly emerged National Peasant Party, the Democratic Party, and of representatives of the Free trade unions. The main lines of policy were laid down in a Programme of the National Independence Front issued in December 1944. This statement of policy expresses adherence to democratic principles, and affirms the reorientation of foreign policy. In the social and economic field the outstanding points were: land reform, public control over industrial monopolies, and prevention of unemployment. One clause of the Programme points, though cautiously, towards economic planning in claiming that reconstruction should be effected within the framework of a Government-sponsored plan.

642 The National Independence Front formed the provisional Government in December 1944 and public administration was reorganized through the local branches of the Front. Following the general elections in November 1945 a coalition consisting of four parties, the Smallholders, the National Peasant Party, the Social-Democrats, and the Communists, was established. This coalition, surviving the elections of August 1947, was the basis of the successive Cabinets until the first quarter of 1948.

[423] 471 In accordance with the Programme of the National Independence Front, in agriculture the big and medium-sized estates were divided into small holdings, in industry such branches as were monopolistic in character were nationalized. Even at the time, when the whole range of light industries and engineering, except for two big concerns, wholesale trade, and naturally the retail trade and small-scale industry, were still left in the hands of private enterprise, State interference and State influence were far-reaching. Not only was the character of a war economy

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365 It is clear that Hungary cannot emerge from the catastrophe of the present war without radical alterations of its country life.

368 365 **THE MOVEMENT FOR AGRARIAN REFORM.** There have, indeed, already been considerable changes in the last few years. Not only has the Government begun to take more interest in the villagers and farm labourers, but all Hungarian society has woken up to the fact that there was here a very neglected and miserable class, making up one-third of the whole population of the country. A group of young men went round the villages and described conditions, just as Charles Kingsley did for England a century ago, in a way which made everyone uneasy. The peasants and labourers themselves began to organize and to get into touch with other classes, particularly the socialists in the towns, and before March 1944, when the German occupation set everything back again, a strong political movement was growing up for land distribution, better conditions of work and more political freedom generally. The leaders of this movement were imprisoned by the Germans and their puppets; but, as soon as the latter were driven out, it was certain that the whole movement would spring up again and that no one would be able to stop it. In fact, the peasant leaders were prominent among the men who, as described below, set up a new government at Debreczen at Christmas 1944.

369 361 **THE LIFE OF THE VILLAGE.** Meanwhile, life in a Hungarian village is quiet enough. Where there is a 'big house', it is the centre of things, even for

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GERMAN ANTI-SEMITISM. After the last war, how-
ever, there was a considerable reaction against the 563
Jews, partly because the Communist leader Béla 668
Kún, who ruled in Hungary for some months in 578
1919, and most of his leading assistants, were Jews.
Furthermore, times were changing. There were no longer places enough to go round in the State service and the younger generation of Magyars began to look for business careers, and to regard the Jews as rivals. This affected especially a class of Hungarians who have played a very important and very disastrous part in recent history: the young generation of 'Swabians' (see Chapter 1). The sons of Swabian peasants who came to Budapest to make their living could not, like the son of the old Magyar aristocratic or 'gentry' family, reckon on influential family connections to get them safe jobs in some ministry. They had to make their own way in the world, and it was they, more than any other class, who felt the force of the Jewish competition. Then when Hitler and his Nazis came into power in Germany, the Swabians, in spite of their Magyar upbringing, and very often, Magyar names, suddenly felt themselves German. They not only sympathized with Germany's political aims, but also with the Nazi social ideas, including anti-semitism. They infected others, and before long there was a considerable party in Hungary clamouring noisily for the adoption of the Nazi system, and in particular for laws and measures against the Jews similar to those which the Nazis were enforcing in Germany.

The Hungarian government and people did not 563
give way easily to this clamour. But it was not diffi- 661
cult to whip up a good deal of ill-feeling against the

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it is difficult to say, for the events of 1944 have deepened the consciousness, even among those who repudiated the excesses, of the difference between the two races, and the problem of finding jobs for the younger generation of non-Jews is not likely to have become easier.

LIFE OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS. About a quarter of the population of Hungary is employed in industry. The term covers all industrial processes, down to the village smith or carpenter, and nearly one-half of the persons listed as 'industrial workers', are in fact artisans or home-workers or employed in very small concerns with perhaps only one or two assistants. The government has always been anxious to encourage this smaller industry, both as a means of relieving rural unemployment and as constituting a social, dependable, God-fearing element of the population.

The other and greater half are the factory workers, employed in larger concerns with a pay-roll of ten or more. The most important of them are the great Manfred Weiss munition and metallurgical factories on Csepel Island, south of Budapest. There is a big iron works, belonging to the State, at Diosgyör, another munitions factory at Gyor, and some sizeable textile factories in Budapest. Outside Pécs, there are local mines. All industry developed quickly after the outbreak of war, to meet the needs, not only of munitions, but of other supplies for the army.

The position of the industrial workers in Hungary is, on the whole a good deal more satisfactory than that of the workers in the villages. As in every

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467 country in the nineteenth century, the authorities
668 were hostile to the idea of the workers organizing, and when they began to do so, tried to split the movement by setting up a 'national' centre, in which all the workers in State service, including the employees of the railways, had to belong. There were also Christian Trade Unions. But the Social Democrat Trade Union movement, akin to the British Labour movement, proved much the stronger, and although the Trade Unions were forbidden to engage in politics, they got round this by forming 'shadow' unions, to which each member of an official union belonged. Ever since the last war the Social Democrat Party has managed to win a few seats in Parliament. Like the Peasant leaders, the Social Democrat leaders stood up boldly during the present war for freedom and independence and openly opposed the Government's subservience to Germany. In 1943 and 1944, after they had concluded an alliance with the peasants' leaders, they were becoming a power in the land. In March 1944, the puppet government imprisoned them and placed the whole Labour movement under the 'national labour centre', afterwards introducing new single labour organization for the whole country. The workers' own leaders re-emerged to take a leading part in the Provisional Government established in the area controlled by the Red Army, in December 1944.[1]

645 [1] In the Miklós Government, responsible to the elected Provincial National Assembly at Debreczen, Agoston Valentini, a branch Secretary of the Social Democrat Party, became Minister of Justice, Dr Takats, also a Social Democrat, Minister of Industry, and Dr Molnár, of the same party, Minister of Social Services.

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tion of Hungary from Austria and subsequently proclaimed Hungary a Republic. Károlyi attempted to carry through social and democratic reforms, but the situation was too much for him. Rumanians, Czechs and Serbs were pushing into the areas claimed by them, economic distress was extreme and radical agitation grew. Eventually, in March 1919, Károlyi was supplanted by a Communist Government, in which the ruling spirit was Béla Kún, who also failed either to rally the country behind him or to stop the advancing armies of Hungary's neighbours. In the summer of 1919, Rumanian troops actually occupied Budapest—leaving behind them, when at last they were induced to retire, many bitter memories.

A 'White' Government had meanwhile been organizing outside the reach of the 'Red' regime. Their representatives now entered Hungary and established themselves as the legal Government. Before conditions had settled down they had carried through against their predecessors a 'White terror', which has never been forgiven them.

The men of this regime were by their own confession, and indeed, by their own boast, essentially 'counter-revolutionaries'. They ascribed to 'Bolshevism' every imaginable horror, and thus looked on Russia, as the seat of the Third International, with a double fear and loathing. Thus Hitler's denunciations of Bolshevism found a ready hearing among the ruling classes in Hungary, and they carried their country into war in 1941 cheerfully enough, under the impression that the victorious German army was not only going to destroy the Slav danger, but also to 'exterminate Bolshevism'

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Nor were the traditional ruling classes the only blind 'anti-Bolsheviks' in the country. The Arrow Cross, who seized power in October 1944 precisely because the Regent had agreed to seek terms in Moscow, were fanatic in their hatred of Bolshevism; and yet this movement, although not representative of the proletariat, was largely drawn from it.

THE LEGACY OF THE TURKISH OCCUPATION. The anti-Bolshevik element is quite modern, and applies only to the present generation. The other question, that of the 'Slav menace' is part of the larger problem which really settled which side Hungary would take, both in this war and in the last. Indeed, the whole position probably dates back to the blood-letting of the Turkish wars, from which, as has been shown, Hungary emerged with only the centre of her territory Magyar and with Slavs and Rumanians in the majority in the north, south and east. Distasteful and oppressive as the subsequent Habsburg rule was to Hungary, most Hungarians recognized that only Habsburg protection could save them from the Turks, and in more modern times, from other dangers: Russia, and the claims of Serbia and Rumania. In the last half-century before 1918, while this situation still existed, a new factor was introduced by the aspirations of the Slavs inside Austria itself. A federalization of Austria, as the Austrian Slavs desired it, might have kept the Monarchy intact but would inevitably have led sooner or later, to Hungary loosing her own Slav districts. Thus the Hungarian leaders found themselves bound not only to Austria, but to the centralist German element

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in Austria, as the only racial element in that country which did not threaten Hungary's territorial integrity; for the Germans of Austria did not interest themselves particularly in Hungary's German population.

THE BOND WITH AUSTRIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. Although, therefore, in 1914 the leaders of Hungary genuinely did not want the war, self-preservation prohibited them from leaving Austria and Germany in the lurch, even if they had been able to determine their own foreign policy, which was not the case. Thus in 1918 they were inevitably left, with the Germans of Austria, as the defeated enemy, while the other nations of the Monarchy gained their independence at the hands of the Allies, forming, largely at the expense of Hungary, the new States of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and the greatly enlarged State of Rumania.

It is true that Austria also received some German-inhabited districts in West Hungary, the Burgenland, but although Hungary bitterly resented Austria's action in claiming these districts, as treachery to her old partner, they were insignificant compared to what was lost to the other States. Moreover, there were only a few thousand Magyars in the Burgenland, while Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia each received, not only the distfricts in which Slavs or Rumanians, as the case might be, were in the majority, but also considerable districts inhabited by Magyars. Some of these, as parts of Transylvania, could not be left with Hungary without leaving a larger number of non-Magyars in that country. Other districts lay right

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on the frontiers, but were taken from Hungary, in spite of their populations, for economic or strategic reasons. In this way Rumania got, in round figures and according to the Hungarian census of 1910,[1] 1,700,000 Magyars, together with 2,800,000 Rumanians and 750,000 other nationalities; Czechoslovakia 1,050,000 Magyars, with 1,690,000 Slovaks, 420,000 Ruthenes and 325,000 others; and Yugoslavia (excluding Croatia, the cession of which Hungary recognized) 470,000 Magyars with 605,000 Serbs, Croats and other Yugoslavs, and 450,000 others.

THE POLICY OF REVISION. From the day on which the Hungarian delegates signed the Treaty of Trianon, the whole of Hungarian foreign policy could be summed up in the single word 'revision'—revision of the Treaty which had inflicted these losses on the Kingdom. Many Hungarians, of course, understood by 'revision' the complete restoration of 'historic Hungary'. They had been brought up in an intense pride in their ancient state, with its 'millenary frontiers' and in a firm belief that no other order was right, natural or even, in the long run, possible in the Danube basin. They had been taught to believe that the 'disloyalty' of the non-Magyars was simply the work of a few agitators, fomented from outside—from Rumania, Serbia or the anti-Hungarian forces in Austria. They believed that the peoples them-

[1] The census subsequently taken by all Successor States were, indeed, much less favourable to the Magyar element, but still showed large numbers of Magyars in each of these three States.

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selves were attached to Hungary and readily accepted the rule in it of the Magyar or Magyarized oligarchy and that they had no real cause of complaint. Others admitted that the non-Magyars had had much to complain of, and had become disaffected, but put the blame solely on the unwise and intolerant policy of the governments of the past half century and thought that a different policy would have ensured the loyalty of the 'nationalists'.

This belief in the justification of historic Hungary and demand for 'integral revision' was most freely expressed by those Magyars whose homes had been in the non-Magyar districts now lost to Hungary. These included many Magyar landowners, whose estates had been situated among non-Magyar peasants, among whom they were divided up by the new governments. This gave the latter the excuse of representing the whole revisionist movement as the work of a few landowners anxious to save or to recover their estates. This was a misrepresentation: for the landowners, although they would have preferred to save their estates, would still have wished to remain in Hungary on any terms, and many other persons besides them believed in 'integral revision'. But it is true that the whole question was made more difficult by the widespread Hungarian belief that the whole structure of the Danube basin ought to be centralized in Budapest and run on a uniform system which could, under the circumstances, be only a Magyar national one; that only a State, Magyar in form, could deal with its problems. From this it was only a step to the attitude that the Magyars

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themselves were the natural superiors of their neighbours, a *Herrenvolk* acknowledging no equals except, indeed, the Germans.

This *Herrenvolk* attitude, which was so bitterly and so justly resented by Hungary's neighbours, represented, of course, the outlook of the ruling class, whose domination, in its social and political aspects, pressed just as heavily on the Magyar peasants and workers as on the non-Magyars. But it does not account for the whole of the Hungarian 'revisionism'. The poor man in Hungary cared nothing for the estates of the Transylvanian magnates, and did not challenge the right of the 'nationalities' to freedom. But even he felt the Treaty to be unjust, and agreed with his government at least in the wish for a 'lesser revision' which would restore to Hungary the Magyar populations now left just outside the frontiers.

THE REVISIONIST PURPOSE OF THE GERMAN ALLIANCE. Hungary ended by joining Germany again in the present war because Germany, like her a loser in the last war, also wished to upset the system which the victors had set up after it, and was thus the only power both willing and, perhaps, strong enough to help her to her 'revision'. Thus the Hungarian position and actions in the present war have been the direct outcome of the last. Indeed, the two are so closely interconnected that it is really hardly fair to speak of Hungary as following the same course 'twice in a generation'; the whole is really only one story.

Many Hungarians felt deep misgivings about the course which they ended by adopting. The pro-

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German element was, indeed, constantly urging the closest possible friendship with Germany. They not only argued that no other country would help Hungary, but even if she could have chosen her helpers, they would have preferred Germany to be the choice, both as Hungary's 'natural ally' against the Slavs, and, after Hitler came into power, as the embodiment of counter-revolution, anti-Bolshevism and anti-Semitism. They ridiculed the idea that any force in the world would be able to stand up to the mighty German army.

Men who thought along these lines were very influential in Hungary, especially in the army, and were strongly represented in successive governments. General Gömbös, who was Hungarian Prime Minister in the early thirties, was one of them, and did much to lay the foundations of the later close co-operation between Hungary and Germany.

POSITION OF THE MODERATES. But not all Hungarians liked Hitler's ideas. There were, and are, many who hoped to see Hungary develop along more modern and more democratic lines. Then there was the old, widespread dislike of the Germans, inherited from the old revolts against the Austrian Emperors. There was a deep fear that if the Germans did win, their victory would not benefit the Hungarians, who would be enslaved just like all the other smaller peoples of Europe. Finally, a few of the more travelled and far-seeing Hungarian politicians knew something of the resources of the Western Powers and were not convinced that the German army was, after all, invincible.

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The Hungarians who thought this way were still unwilling to ally themselves with the Little Entente, on the terms of giving up revision. But they looked for allies not to Germany, but to the two other nearby countries in something of the same position as themselves, Italy and Poland, and they always hoped that, if revision came, they could get the Western Powers to participate in arranging it or at any rate to approve it. The leader of this school of thought was Count Paul Teleki, who became Prime Minister for the second time in 1939 (he had held the same position for a short time in 1921).

MUNICH: ASCENDANCY OF THE PRO-GERMANS. No Hungarian Government, however, was prepared actually to refuse restoration of the Magyar areas if offered it, even by Germany, and things developed in a way which at first seemed to give the all-out-for-Germany party very much the best of the argument. Throughout the years after the war, when Germany was still weak, both Hungary's neighbours and the Western Powers supported the *status quo* in its entirety. In 1927 Hungary concluded a Treaty with Italy, and Mussolini publicly took up the Hungarian cause. But it soon appeared that Italy would never be able to give Hungary much more than words; and she moved over presently to the 'Axis'. Poland was even less of a help. Thus it appeared that after all, Hungary would never get anything unless Germany moved, and even then, she might not benefit unless she took care to be on good terms with Germany. In fact, when the first real chance came—at Munich in

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1938—the Hungarian Government of the day nearly missed the boat altogether, for having been too independent toward Germany in the preceding months. Hurriedly they tried to make amends and ended by getting awarded to them the southern strip of Slovakia and Ruthenia at the expense of Czechoslovakia; but now they had to take it at the hands of Germany and Italy, with the Western Powers disapproving.

So things went on. The Hungarians occupied Ruthenia in March 1939, and represented what they did as a move against Germany; but in Britain it was regarded as another stab in the back of Czechoslovakia. Then came the invasion of Poland by Germany with Britain and France coming in to help Poland. At first the Hungarian Government tried to keep out, and were able to do so since Italy was following the same course. They even went so far as to bury their quarrel with Yugoslavia. But they were unwilling to do the same with Rumania, to whom Hungary had lost much more, both in area and population by the Treaty of Trianon. And Rumania had recently received a guarantee from Britain.

THE VIENNA AWARD. Thus when the chance of revision here came, in the summer of 1940—this time through Russia's action—Hungary again had to take it from the Axis, if at all. The result was the Second Vienna Award, of 30th August 1940, which gave Hungary Northern Transylvania.

The population in Transylvania is particularly mixed, and it is practically impossible to draw a line which does not favour one side or the other.

727 659 destroyed, while Debrecen, bulwark of Hungarian Calvinism, lay in ruins, including the famous Great Church. The 700-years-old Calvinist College remained intact and the Provisional National Assembly held its first meeting within its walls. We [563] learned that the Jews were last put to work on fortifications at Budapest and Vienna. A strong protest was made to Regent Horthy against the inhuman deportations. Under ecclesiastical pressure these were discontinued after July 1, but they were resumed under Szálasi, who ordered not only Jews but everyone unfriendly to Hitlerism to be deported. Szálasi and the Gestapo began proceedings against all Calvinist priests who raised their voices on behalf of the persecuted Jews. The 400-years-old College of Sárospatak succeeded in preserving the Jews' wealth, school-books and ecclesiastical robes."

[668] Nevertheless, from the end of 1942, when a united front against Horthy had been formed which opposed the war against the Soviet Union, it had included Catholic laity if not clergy, and Protestants, and when the first National Assembly met again in the Calvinist College in Debrecen in 1944 the Provisional Government had extremely strong Protestant backing, particularly from the Calvinists, who provided one of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Liberation and After

After the Liberation the church situation in Hungary rapidly crystallised. To understand it, three points need to be noted:

659 [641] The first is the attitude of the Government, which is effectively summed up in the Constitution adopted by the National Assembly on August 18, 1949, Article 54 of which states:—

1. "The Hungarian People's Republic guarantees the freedom of conscience of the citizens and the right to exercise their religion freely."

2. "In order to be able to assure freedom of conscience the Hungarian People's Republic separates Church from State."

To this might be added an extract from a speech made by the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Rákosi, on April 25, 1948, at the time of the controversy on the nationalisation of schools:—

"I must speak of one of the unsolved problems of democracy, that of relations between democracy and the Church. As everybody knows, Hungarian democracy stands for the most complete freedom of religion. Communists especially have voiced this since the first moment of the Liberation; and, of course, we have not only voiced it but have also lived up to it. Even to-day we do not think otherwise. In this connection allow me to mention one fact. For May 1 we shall provide bronze for casting church bells for 778 parishes. In so doing the Government is fulfilling a promise made for the centenary* year.

* Centenary of the 1848 revolution, which sought to obtain Hungary's independence from Austria.

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Postwar Hungary

By Andrew Gyorgy

Since the end of military operations Danubian Europe has been undergoing a social and political upheaval in which, paradoxically, both Communism and a resurgent nationalism seem to be powerful elements. The most significant contributing factor in this atmosphere of political unrest is the all-too-direct domination of the Soviet Union whose policies are guided by conflicting motivations and divergent objectives, results of the flexible strategic and economic considerations of the Kremlin.[1]

Hungary today is in a more precarious position than any of her Danubian neighbors. Hungarians have not fought heroically for liberation as have the Yugoslavs, nor do they enjoy the political prestige Czechoslovakia accumulated through the democratic experience of twenty years. Hungary has no oil, no significant trade-routes, no vital strategic lines of communication as do Rumania and Bulgaria, no well-defined political boundaries which also afford strategic defense, as in the case of Turkey. In view of all these strikingly unfavorable facts and developments, Hungary's present-day hopes and future aspirations are of necessity aimed toward "a well consolidated domestic policy motivated and vitalized by the momentum of radical reform policies."[2] It is the purpose of this article to show the steps taken in the political reconstruction of post-World War II Hungary as well as the forces working against it.

On February 1, 1946, an official proclamation by the first democratically elected National Assembly unanimously terminated the 945 year-old Hungarian monarchy and declared Hungary a republic. With the simultaneous emergence of a fairly representative and ideologically

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* This article, completed before the Communist putsch of late May, 1947, remains timely as a description of the methods used by a Communist minority to seize power. —THE EDITORS.

1 Soviet policies in Danubian Europe center around three major objectives: 1) to prevent the use of Danubian states as bases for future aggression against Soviet territory; 2) to achieve farreaching social reforms in most of these countries; and 3) to compensate the Soviet people at the expense of the vanquished, who will be forced to contribute heavily to the economic reconstruction of the Soviet Union. Cf. "The Danubian States, Soviet Aims in South-East Europe," *The Times*, London, Nov. 11, 1946, pp. 5 ff.

2 Cf. István Bibó, "A Magyar Demokrácia Válsága, (The Crisis of Hungarian Democracy)" in *Valóság*, October-December, 1945, p. 39.

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795 When in 1944 the defeat of Hitler was foreshadowed by
661 the reign of terror which found in the Jew its major victim,
793 the Papal Nuncio in Budapest issued countless "letters of protection" to Jews, enabling them to live in buildings which were the property of the Vatican and therefore entitled to diplomatic immunity. Nor did the Church itself escape paying a heavy price. Although Hungarians suffered less drastically than the Poles or Czechs at the hands of the Nazis many of their priests took the bitter road to Dachau. Others, including two bishops, were incarcerated in Hungarian prisons. During the winter of 1944 the Nazis executed the senior chaplain of the Hungarian Army. When defeat came the priests of Hungary did not flee. Only 12 out of more than 1,200 abandoned their rectories. Witness the death of William Apor, Bishop of Győr. Drunken Soviet soldiers entered his residence and tried to force their way into the cellar, where a number of women were hiding. The Bishop calmly met them face to face, in an effort to pacify them. He died in a fusillade of bullets, but the women were spared.

•661 Yet this heroism was destined to earn no earthly reward.
642 After 1945 there ensued instead one of the heaviest-handed enslavements of a people, and one of the direst persecutions of the Christian faith, of which history has record. Though we shall be concerned with the second, let us not forget the first. For the Communist Party the sole important question was how quickly and completely the opposition could be liquidated, regardless of the means or the cost to the population. The Hungarian people struggled to elect a non-Communist government and, despite great difficulties, succeeded. The November, 1945, election resulted in the triumph of the "conservative" opposition. Even after Communist intrigue and machinations forced out of office the government thus chosen, the Communist Party was defeated in the election of August, 1947, obtaining less than 23 per cent of the vote.

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Nevertheless, with the help of the Russian Army and the Communist-infiltrated police force, all parties professing opposition to Communism were disbanded, the Independent People's Front was created, and it was announced that the People's Republic had been established. A single slate of candidates was presented to the voters in the election of May 15, 1948, and naturally the Communist candidates were chosen by an overwhelming majority.

We shall now review the developments which affected relations between Church and State and culminated in violent persecution.

The Catholic Church was a target first of all by reason of its material possessions. The Land Reform Law decreed during 1945 was drastic but could be defended in principle. It affected the holdings of wealthy owners and their buildings and livestock. Estates of more than a thousand acres were to be broken up completely. Owners of smaller properties were permitted to retain one hundred acres. However, the reform proved to be a poorly camouflaged prelude to the creation of collective farms—agricultural properties owned and exploited by the State. Communists, regardless of aptitude for farming or the validity of their claims, received virtually all the land which was redistributed. The State fared even better. By July 1, 1946, it was owner and manager of fully one-eighth of all the landed property in Hungary. None of the former owners received compensation. The new peasant proprietors were, it is true, compelled to make payments at regular intervals to amortize the cost of the land assigned to them. However, the moneys thus collected went into the State Treasury. By the beginning of 1948, the owners of one-hundred-acre estates, who had previously been affluent, were being pushed to the wall; for all farms larger than fifteen acres were taxed so heavily in grain and produce that it was utterly impossible

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178 cupied a position of trust or responsibility in the country prior
661 to 1945 was now impoverished and ostracized. The number of distinguished exiles was legion. Economic conditions had deteriorated so completely that even food, product of the rich plains, was lacking. Tens of thousands who could find no employment in the industries which were being created by fiat, by reason of age or of earlier religious and political affiliations, were marked for deportation. These wholesale shipments of human cattle aroused the indignation of the outside world. Lord Vansittart reported to the House of Lords that 100,000 persons had been earmarked for slave-labor camps. For a time this ghastly business was halted; but seemingly reliable information indicates that the shipments were resumed during 1952.

626 As elsewhere in the Russian orbit, the emphasis was on
461 production and organization for war. Russian military and
186 economic officials virtually took over the country. Criticism of the workers and particularly youth was everywhere part of the order of the day. Young Hungarians, the government declared again and again, had been inoculated with the diseases of pacifism and pro-Imperialism. Even the official Youth Organization, DISZ, was accused of "cosmopolitanism" and "adoration of the Anglo-American imperialist monster." On June 28, 1952, Matron Horváth, speaking for the Communist Party, reemphasized the need for continued intensive opposition to "clerical reaction." He expressed shocked surprise that some members of the Party still participated in religious functions and, indeed, permitted the Church to influence their children.

668 This would be as pertinent a note as any on which to end our account of the Hungarian tragedy were it not for the breath-taking events which have followed the death of Stalin. Years of draining away the substance of the people and of

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endeavoring to clamp the peasants into the vise of collective farming had created a movement of resistance which could no longer be curbed. Demands for return of the land that had been collectivized, together with farm animals, rose spontaneously from the farm folk everywhere in Hungary. Rákosi was removed from office, and Imre Nagy, a non-Communist, was restored to the office he had once held. On July 11 Nagy declared in a startling address that the collective farms would be dissolved if the majority of the peasants banded together on them so desired, and that their lands would thereupon be given back to them. It is true that men who took this proclamation literally often found themselves denounced as "kulaks" and enemies of the people. But a careful review of reports from those who have daily monitored official Hungarian broadcasts indicates clearly that the government, wedged in between the peasants' demand for liberation and the desperate need of the population for food, is far weaker than anyone would have deemed it to be a short time ago.

In the circumstances, it is safe to say that the average Hungarian recalls with grim irony the final speech delivered by Rákosi on May 10, during the "political campaign":

> Let us be vigilant in all fields . . . and ruthlessly take action against all who sabotage the building of our happier future. Our People's Democracy must incessantly watch for conspiracies, sabotage, and espionage activities which, without exception, are initiated, organized, and financed by the United States. Even now the United States is making so-called liberation promises which mean nothing save that it seeks to restore the rule of reactionary lords over the liberated Hungarian people.

Not even the United States could have so stirred the people of Hungary to reaffirm, despite terror and need, its traditional belief in freedom as the bulwark of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.